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A GRAVE INJUSTICE:
THE UNCHARITABLE FEDERAL TAX TREATMENT
OF BEQUESTS TO PUBLIC CEMETERIES
INTRODUCTION
Under current case law, the living may make tax-deductible contribu-
tions to public cemeteries,1 but the dead may not. It is not at all clear,
however, that in framing the Internal Revenue Code, Congress intended
this incongruity. Moreover, the case law cuts off public cemeteries from
an important class of potential benefactors-a result hardly compatible
with the public interest in maintaining our cemeteries as dignified and
beautiful resting places for those who gave us life.
The Code's estate tax provisions permit a deduction from the de-
ceased's taxable estate of any bequest "to or for the use of any corpora-
tion organized and operated exclusively for... charitable" and other
enumerated purposes.2 Eight federal courts have considered whether a
bequest for the general maintenance or operation of a public cemetery
qualifies for this deduction.3 All have answered in the negative.4 Each of
these courts based its decision on an analysis of one or more of three
aspects of the federal tax laws: the framework of the Code's charitable
provisions,5 the meaning of the word "charitable" in the Code,6 and the
1. Throughout this Note, the term "public cemetery" denotes a burial ground that is
organized and operated by a nongovernmental, nonprofit association, company, or corpo-
ration and is held open to the use of the public. This definition is recognized in the
common law. See, e.g., Starr Burying Ground Ass'n v. North Lane Cemetery Ass'n, 77
Conn. 83, 87, 58 A. 467, 469 (1904); Davie v. Rochester Cemetery Ass'n, 91 N.H. 494,
495, 23 A.2d 377, 378 (1941); 14 C.J.S. Cemeteries § 1 (1939 & Supp. 1989).
2. See I.R.C. § 2055(a) (1986). It reads in pertinent part:
[T]he value of the taxable estate shall be determined by deducting from the
value of the gross estate the amount of all bequests... (2) to or for the use of
any corporation organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable,
scientific, literary, or educational purposes, including the encouragement of art,
or to foster national or international amateur sports competition ... , and [sic]
the prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net earnings of
which inures to the benefit of any private stockholder or individual ....
3. See Mellon Bank v. United States, 762 F.2d 283 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1032 (1986); Child v. United States, 540 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1092 (1977); Gund's Estate v. Commissioner, 113 F.2d 61 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
311 U.S. 696 (1940); Robertson v. United States, 87-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) t 13,712, at
87,935 (M.D. Tenn. 1987), aff'd, 838 F.2d 1215 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 245
(1988); Smith v. United States, 84-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 13,595, at 86,203 (W.D. Mo.
1984); Bank of Carthage v. United States, 304 F. Supp. 77 (W.D. Mo. 1969); Estate of
Amick v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 924 (1977); Wilber Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 17
B.T.A. 654 (1929).
4. See supra note 3.
5. See Mellon Bank, 762 F.2d at 285-86; Child, 540 F.2d at 581-82; Gund's Estate,
113 F.2d at 63-64; Robertson, 87-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) at 87,936; Bank of Carthage,
304 F. Supp. at 80-81.
6. See Child, 540 F.2d at 582-84; Gund's Estate, 113 F.2d at 63; Bank of Carthage,
304 F. Supp. at 80; Estate of Amick, 67 T.C. at 927-30; Wilber Nat'l Bank, 17 B.T.A. at
660-62.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
requirement that qualified entities be organized and operated "exclu-
sively" for charitable purposes.7
Despite the weight of precedent, the issue is not a settled one. Dissents
to denial of certiorari in two recent cases have strongly questioned the
framework analysis of some of the earlier holdings.' Doubt is cast on
other holdings by the pronouncements of the Supreme Court in Bob
Jones University v. United States9 with respect to the meaning of the
word "charitable" in a federal tax context.
This Note argues that continued denial of the estate tax charitable de-
duction for bequests to public cemeteries is unjustified. Part I presents
background on the content and framework of the relevant Code provi-
sions, the tax meaning of the word "charitable," and the application of
the Code's exclusivity doctrine. Part II challenges the federal courts'
analyses in the public cemetery cases based on each of these criteria. The
public policy grounds for granting charitable treatment to such ceme-
teries are set out in Part III. The Note concludes that public cemeteries
as a class are exclusively charitable entities within the meaning of the
Code and that the federal courts should therefore reexamine whether be-
quests to such cemeteries are entitled to the benefit of the estate tax char-
itable deduction.
I. BACKGROUND: PROBLEMS OF INTERPRETATION
OF THE CODE'S CHARITABLE PROVISIONS
A. Content and Framework of the Relevant Statutes
Since their inception, the federal tax laws have accorded special treat-
ment to certain nonprofit organizations.1" Under several provisions of
the Internal Revenue Code, including the income tax exemption," the
income tax charitable deduction, 2 and the estate tax charitable deduc-
tion13 sections, qualified entities receive both direct and indirect bene-
fits."1 Analysis of whether bequests to public cemeteries are eligible for
7. See Child, 540 F.2d at 582-84; Smith, 84-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) at 86,206-07;
Estate of Amick, 67 T.C. at 927-28.
8. See Robertson v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 245 (1988) (Blackmun, J., dissenting to
denial of certiorari); Mellon Bank v. United States, 475 U.S. 1032 (1986) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting to denial of certiorari).
9. 461 U.S. 574 (1983)
10. See B. Hopkins, The Law of Tax-Exempt Organizations § 1.2, at 5 (5th ed. 1987).
11. I.R.C. § 501 (1986).
12. I.R.C. § 170 (1986).
13. I.R.C. § 2055 (1986).
14. I.R.C. section 501 exempts qualified organizations from payment of income tax.
Sections 170 and 2055 give the direct benefit of the charitable deduction to contributors
to qualified organizations, but provide a substantial indirect benefit to the organizations
that qualify as transferees under them. Professor Feldstein has estimated that if the in-
come tax charitable deduction were eliminated, total giving to charity by individuals
would decline about 20 percent. See Feldstein, The Income Tax and Charitable Contri-
butions: Part 11-The Impact on Religious, Educational and Other Organizations, 28
Nat'l Tax J. 209, 224 (1975). He notes, however, that if giving to religious organizations,
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the estate tax deduction requires a brief review of these three sections.
With roots in the Tariff Act of 189415 the organizational income tax
exemption is the oldest, as well as the broadest, of the three provisions.
Because Congress has never offered a definitive rationale for the exemp-
tion, 6 various theories have been advanced to explain it, including his-
torical precedent,17 public policy,18 the influence of special interests, 9
and a poor conceptual fit between the idea of "income" and the purposes
and operations of institutions that do not seek private profit.20
In its modem form, the exemption section relieves from the burden of
federal income taxation twenty-five classes of nonprofit corporations, so-
cieties, trusts, and other entities.21 Among them are cemetery companies
and membership associations that are
not operated for profit; and any corporation chartered solely for the
purpose of the disposal of bodies by burial or cremation which is not
permitted by its charter to engage in any business not necessarily inci-
dent to that purpose, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the
benefit of any private shareholder or individual.22
Of all the types of organizations exempted from payment of income tax,
only those enumerated in Code section 501(c)(3) are generally regarded
which is much less price sensitive than giving to most other charities, is removed from the
equation, the negative impact of such an elimination becomes far greater. See id. at 223-
24. According to Professor McNulty, while no similar analyses have been undertaken to
estimate the effect on charities of eliminating the estate and gift tax charitable deductions,
"anecdotal evidence as well as an intuitive understanding of the law... [suggest] that the
presence of the deductions does increase the amount of charitable giving." McNulty,
Public Policy and Private Charity: A Tax Policy Perspective, 3 Va. Tax Rev. 229, 249
(1984); see also Thompson, The Unadministrability of the Federal Charitable Tax Exemp-
tion: Causes, Effects and Remedies, 5 Va. Tax Rev. 1, 3-4 (1985) (appearance on I.R.S.
list of entities eligible to receive tax-deductible donations "essential to successful fundrais-
ing for most charitable organizations").
15. Ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. 509 (1894). The 1894 Act imposed a federal income tax
but exempted religious, charitable, educational, and fraternal organizations and certain
mutual savings banks and insurance companies. See id. at 556-57. The entire Act was
struck down in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895), as a non-
apportioned direct tax in violation of Article I, section 9, of the United States Constitu-
tion. See id. at 637. The exemption reappeared in expanded form in the Tariff Act of
1913, ch. 16, § IIG(a), 38 Stat. 114, 172 (1913), the first federal income tax law enacted
after the passage of the sixteenth amendment to the Constitution, which gives Congress
unfettered power to impose income taxes.
16. See Bittker & Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations from Federal
Income Taxation, 85 Yale L.J. 299, 301-04 (1976).
17. See B. Hopkins, supra note 10, § 1.2, at 5-6; McGovern, The Exemption Provi-
sions of Subchapter F, 29 Tax Law. 523, 526 (1976); Reiling, Federal Taxation.: What Is a
Charitable Organization?, 44 A.B.A.J. 525, 526 (1958).
18. See B. Hopkins, supra note 10, § 1.2; P. Treusch, Tax Exempt Charitable Organi-
zations, ch. 1-B.02 (3d ed. 1988).
19. See McGovern, supra note 17, at 527.
20. See Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 16, at 307-14.
21. See I.R.C. § 501(c) (1986).
22. I.R.C. § 501(c)(13) (1986).
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as "charitable" in the legal sense of the term.23 This section extends the
exemption to entities that are "organized and operated exclusively for
religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or edu-
cational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports
competition... , or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals
...."24 While there has been debate about the precise meaning of "char-
itable" in the Code,25 section 501(c)(3) is almost universally referred to
as the "charitable exemption."
The income tax charitable deduction section was first enacted in the
War Revenue Act of 1917,26 apparently prompted by concern that war
taxes would diminish contributions to nonprofit organizations serving
important public purposes. 27 This section currently permits individuals
and corporations to deduct from their taxable income contributions to all
but one of the types of organizations enumerated in section 501(c)(3),2 8
as well as to certain additional entities. 29 Nonprofit cemeteries were ad-
ded to this list30 when Congress amended the tax code in 1954."'
The estate tax charitable deduction, which dates to the Revenue Act of
1918,32 offers a list of eligible organizations similar to that in section
501(c)(3). 33 It has never mentioned cemeteries.34
Congress' express enumeration of nonprofit cemeteries in discrete sub-
23. See infra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
24. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1986).
25. See infra notes 40-53 and accompanying text.
26. Ch. 63, § 1201(2), 40 Stat. 300, 330 (1917).
27. See 55 Cong. Rec. 6728 (1917) (statement of Sen. Hollis). Some modem authori-
ties also justify the charitable contribution deduction on the ground that it fosters organi-
zations that accomplish purposes useful to the public. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United
States, 461 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1983). Other theories have been advanced, however. See,
e.g., Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 309 (1972)
(proposing tax definition of "income" as private consumption and arguing that gifts to
charity divert resources away from private consumption); Bittker, Charitable Contribu-
tions: Tax Deductions or Matching Grants?, 28 Tax L. Rev. 37, 59-60 (1972) (charitable
deduction justified because it equitably accounts for contributor's loss in personal
welfare).
28. See I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(B) (1986). This section does not enumerate the purpose of
"testing for public safety," which does appear in section 501(c)(3).
29. See I.R.C. §§ 170(c)(1), 170(c)(3)-(c)(5) (1986).
30. See I.R.C. § 170(c)(5) (1986). The eligibility of nonprofit cemeteries to receive
deductible contributions is set out in section 170 as follows:
(c) [T]he term "charitable contribution" means a contribution or gift to or for
the use of... (5) A cemetery company owned and operated exclusively for the
benefit of its members, or any corporation chartered solely for burial purposes
as a cemetery corporation and not permitted by its charter to engage in any
business not necessarily incident to that purpose, if such company or corpora-
tion is not operated for profit and no part of the net earnings of such company
or corporation inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual.
31. See Internal Revenue Code of 1954, ch. 1 § 170(c)(5), 68A Stat. 3, 60 (1954).
32. Ch. 18, § 403(a)(3), 40 Stat. 1057, 1098 (1919).
33. See I.R.C. § 2055(a)(2) (1986).
34. See Mellon Bank v. United States, 762 F.2d 283, 285 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1032 (1986).
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sections of the Code's income tax exemption and charitable deduction
provisions entitles public and other nonprofit cemeteries to the same tax
benefits accorded "charitable" organizations under separate but compan-
ion subsections of those provisions." The question arises, however,
whether the explicit references to cemeteries imply that public cemeteries
are not covered by the separate subsections that refer to "charitable" or-
ganizations.36 Bequests to public cemeteries squarely raise this issue
posed by the Code's framework because the estate tax chapter qualifies
"charitable" organizations for tax-deductible transfers but is silent as to
nonprofit cemeteries.37
B. The Meaning of "'Charitable" in the Code
If public cemeteries are not preemptively barred from charitable status
by the Code's framework, their eligibility for the benefits of the estate tax
charitable deduction must be viewed in light of what Congress intended
the word "charitable" to mean in the tax statutes.38 Some courts have
held that public cemeteries are not charitable organizations under the
Code because their principal purpose is not to inter the indigent for free
or at reduced cost.39
A lack of clear guidance from Congress on the tax meaning of "chari-
table"'  has opened the door for two schools of thought. On the one
35. Compare I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1986) (income tax charitable exemption) and I.R.C.
§ 170(c)(2) (1986) (income tax charitable deduction for contributions to charitable orga-
nizations) with I.R.C. § 501(c)(13) (1986) (income tax exemption for nonprofit ceme-
teries) and I.R.C. § 170(c)(5) (1986) (income tax charitable deduction for contributions
to nonprofit cemeteries).
36. See Mellon Bank, 762 F.2d at 285-86; Child v. United States, 540 F.2d 579, 581-
82 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1092 (1977); Robertson v. United States, 87-1
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) t 13,712, at 87,936 (M.D. Tenn. 1987), aff'd, 838 F.2d 1215 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 245 (1988).
37. See I.R.C. § 2055(a) (1986).
38. The word "charitable" has the same meaning in the income tax charitable exemp-
tion section and the various charitable deduction sections. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v.
United States, 461 U.S. 574, 590 n.15 (estate tax authority used to construe "charitable"
for purposes of I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)); Mellon Bank, 762 F.2d at 288 (Aldisert, C.J., dissent-
ing) (Supreme Court's interpretation of "charitable" in income tax chapter "equally ap-
plicable" to estate tax section 2055(a)); Child, 540 F.2d at 585 n.2 (Anderson, J.,
dissenting) (Code's income, gift, and estate tax charitable provisions "all subject to the
same definition of 'charitable' "); B. Hopkins, supra note 10, § 4.3, at 59 & n.18 (Code's
charitable sections are "sister provisions" that "should be interpreted together."). The
I.R.S. has promulgated a definition for the word "charitable" only under Code section
501(c)(3), see Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (as amended in 1976), and has not defined
the term separately in the regulations governing section 170(c) or 2055(a).
39. See, e.g., Child, 540 F.2d at 582-83; Gund's Estate v. Commissioner, 113 F.2d 61,
62-63 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 696 (1940); Bank of Carthage v. United States, 304
F. Supp. 77, 80 (W.D. Mo. 1969).
40. The word "charitable" is neither defined in the Code, see Green v. Connally, 330
F. Supp. 1150, 1157 (D.D.C.), aff'd mem. sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971),
nor authoritatively explained in the legislative histories of the charitable exemption and
deduction sections, see B. Hopkins, supra note 10, § 4.3, at 58, 62; Bittker & Rahdert,
supra note 16, at 301-02; Thompson, supra note 14, at 8 & n.27, 12.
1990]
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hand, "charitable" has an ancient and broadly defined legal meaning,
drawn from the law of charitable trusts.41 In this context, the term em-
braces a wide variety of organizational purposes, including relief of the
indigent, advancement of education, religion, and health, lessening the
burdens of government, and a range of other endeavors to promote the
general welfare of the community.42 The Supreme Court impliedly rec-
ognized such a broad rationale for the federal income tax charitable ex-
emption as early as 1924.43 On the other hand, the word "charitable"
also has a popular meaning, confined chiefly to alleviation of poverty.'
A strict reading of the relevant statutes, with attention to the disjunctive
"or" separating the enumerated purposes in each,45 supports the view
that the term is used in this narrow sense and therefore only organiza-
tions that serve the poor are technically charitable.47
The Internal Revenue Service itself has spoken on both sides of the
issue. In 1923, it declared that "charitable" in the Code was to be taken
41. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 588 (1983); 4 J. Mertens, The
Law of Federal Gift and Estate Taxation § 28.22, at 346 (1959); Restatement (Second) of
Trusts § 368 comment a (1959); IVA A. Scott & W. Fratcher, The Law of Trusts §§ 368,
368.1 (4th ed. 1989).
42. See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 587-89; Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass. (14 Allen)
539, 556 (1867); G. Bogert & G. Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees § 369 (2d rev.
ed. 1977); Restatement (Second) of Trusts, § 368 (1959); IVA A. Scott & W. Fratcher,
supra note 41, § 368, at 130-31.
43. See Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden de Predicadores, 263 U.S. 578, 581 (1924) (Code's
charitable exemption section recognizes public benefits provided by enumerated organiza-
tions); see also Helvering v. Bliss, 293 U.S. 144, 147 (1934) (income tax deduction section
enacted "to encourage gifts to religious, educational and other charitable objects") (em-
phasis added). Lower courts have also applied the broad definition of "charitable" in
federal tax cases. See, e.g., Northern California Central Servs., Inc. v. United States, 591
F.2d 620, 626 (Ct. Cl. 1979); Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon, 506 F.2d
1278, 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1974), vacated on other grounds, 426 U.S. 26 (1976); St. Louis
Union Trust Co. v. United States, 374 F.2d 427, 432 (8th Cir. 1967); Girard Trust Co. v.
Commissioner, 122 F.2d 108, 109 (3d Cir. 1941); United States v. Proprietors of Social
Law Library, 102 F.2d 481, 483 (1st Cir. 1939).
44. See Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1157 (D.D.C.), aff'd mem. sub nom.
Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971); G. Bogert & G. Bogert, supra note 42, § 369, at 62-
63; B. Hopkins, supra note 10, § 4.3, at 58; 4 J. Mertens, supra note 41, § 28.22, at 347-48
& n.97.
45. See I.R.C. §§ 170(c)(2)(B), 501(c)(3), 2055(a)(2) (1986).
46. The discrete terms "religious," "educational," "scientific," and the like enumer-
ated in the charitable provisions, see, e.g., I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1986), become redundant if
"charitable" is interpreted in its capacious legal sense. See supra notes 41-42 and accom-
panying text. In Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979), the Supreme Court
stated that unless the context of a statute demands otherwise, "terms connected by a
disjunctive [should] be given separate meanings." Id. at 339; see also Bob Jones Univ. v.
United States, 461 U.S. 574, 617 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (frequent congres-
sional refinements of enumerated purposes in I.R.C. section 501(c)(3) indicate common-
law meaning of "charitable" not intended). But see Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 639
F.2d 147, 151 (4th Cir. 1980) (reading enumerated purposes in section 501(c)(3) disjunc-
tively "tears [that section] from its roots"), aff'd, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
47. See Child v. United States, 540 F.2d 579, 582-84 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1092 (1977); Gund's Estate v. Commissioner, 113 F.2d 61, 63 (6th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 311 U.S. 696 (1940).
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in its narrow "popular and ordinary" sense and not its common-law
sense.48 In 1959, however, the Service reversed itself, ratifying by regula-
tion the broad legal definition of the word.49
In 1983, the Supreme Court settled the question by adopting the broad
common-law meaning of the word "charitable" in a federal tax context.
In Bob Jones University v. United States,"0 the Court ruled that, regard-
less of the enumerated purposes in the Code's charitable exemption sec-
tion, no organization is entitled to tax exemption under section 501(c)(3)
unless it is "charitable" within the meaning of the common law of chari-
table trusts.51 The Court rested its decision on a finding that Congress
had employed the word "charitable" in the Code in its capacious legal
sense. 52 In enacting the income tax charitable exemption and deduction
sections, the Court stated, Congress intended to bestow tax benefits on a
wide range of entities that meet the common-law requirements that a
charitable organization serve public purposes and harmonize with public
policy.5" It is thus plain that charitable status under the common law of
charitable trusts at least strongly suggests charitable status under the In-
ternal Revenue Code.54
48. See I.T. 1800, 11-2 C.B. 152, 153 (1923). The I.R.S. adhered to this narrow defini-
tion for the next 36 years. See B. Hopkins, supra note 10, § 4.3, at 62-63.
49. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (1959). The regulation states that the term
"charitable" is "not to be construed as limited by the separate enumeration in section
501(c)(3) of other tax-exempt purposes which may fall within the broad outlines of 'char-
ity' as developed by judicial, decisions." Id. The Service's change of heart may perhaps
be traced to an influential article published by Herman T. Reiling, then I.R.S. Assistant
Chief Counsel, the year before the new regulation was promulgated. The article force-
fully advocated the view that Congress intended the broad common-law meaning of the
word "charitable" in the Code. See Reiling, supra note 17, at 526-28.
50. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
51. See id. at 586-92. The question before the Court was whether private, nonprofit
educational institutions that met all the facial criteria of Code section 501(c)(3) were
nonetheless barred from tax exemption because their racially discriminatory practices
conflicted with the common-law requirement that "charitable" organizations must oper-
ate in harmony with public policy. The Court ruled that the schools were not charitable
entities and that the I.R.S. had properly revoked their exemptions. See id. at 598, 605.
52. See id. at 587-90.
53. See id. at 586-92. The Bob Jones University court did not address whether other
requirements of the common law of charitable trusts are also implicated in the Code's
charitable provisions. See id. at 588 n.12. It is apparent, however, that at least some of
them are. For example, the common-law requirement that a legal charity serve a large
enough class of beneficiaries that it can be said to benefit the community as a whole, see
G. Bogert & G. Bogert, supra note 42, § 365, at 26-28; Restatement (Second) of Trusts
§ 375 (1959), is inherent in the Court's "public purpose" criterion for "charitable"
designation under the Code, see Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 586-88. The common-law
requirement that the income of a legal charity not inure to the gain of private individuals,
see G. Bogert & G. Bogert, supra note 42, § 364, at 19; Restatement (Second) of Trusts
§ 376 (1959), is explicit in the Code, see I.R.C. §§ 170(c)(2)(C), 501(c)(3), 2055(a)(2)
(1986).
54. Cf. Reiling, supra note 17, at 595 (organizations generally recognized as charita-
ble by states presumed charitable under federal tax laws).
1990]
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C. The "Exclusively Charitable" Requirement
The estate tax charitable deduction section, like its sister provisions in
the income tax chapter, requires that a qualified entity be organized and
operated "exclusively" for charitable purposes." As this requirement is
interpreted by the federal courts and the Internal Revenue Service, an
organization may maintain charitable status under the Code as long as it
does not pursue any substantial noncharitable purpose.5 6
The language of the Code itself, the governing Treasury regulation,
and the weight of case authority support the position that an organiza-
tion's purposes, and not its activities viewed in isolation from its pur-
poses, are the proper focus of inquiry under the exclusivity
requirement." Nonetheless, confusion persists in. the case law about
whether the requirement may be applied to find a given activity of an
organization inherently noncharitable5 One court, for example, applied
the exclusivity requirement to deny charitable status to two public ceme-
teries solely on the ground that the cemeteries engaged in activities-
selling of gravesites and maintenance of cemetery property-that the
court characterized as noncharitable in nature.5 9
55. See I.R.C. § 2055(a); see also I.R.C. §§ 170(c) (income tax charitable deduction),
501(c)(3) (income tax charitable exemption).
56. See Better Business Bureau v. United States, 326 U.S. 279, 283 (1945); St. Louis
Union Trust Co. v. United States, 374 F.2d 427, 431-32 (8th Cir. 1967); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) (as amended in 1976); 6 J. Mertens, The Law of Federal Income
Taxation § 34.07, at 35 (1983 rev. vol. & Supp. 1984).
57. See, e.g., Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden de Predicadores, 263 U.S. 578, 581 (1924)
(purposes of charitable organization not altered by its commercial activity); Aid to Arti-
sans, Inc. v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 202, 214 (1978) (sale of handicrafts of disadvantaged
artisans not a "purpose" but "merely an activity" that furthers entity's exempt purposes);
I.R.C. §§ 170(c)(2)(B) (qualified organizations must be "organized and operated exclu-
sively for" enumerated purposes), 501(c)(3) (same), 2055(a) (same) (1986); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.501(c)(3)-l(c)(1) (as amended in 1976) (exclusivity requirement applies to organiza-
tion's purposes); Rev. Rul. 74-587, 1974-2 C.B. 162 (organization's purposes, not its ac-
tivities, are focus of inquiry under exclusivity requirement); Rev. Rul. 69-572, 1969-2
C.B. 119 (same).
58. See, for example, Northern California Central Services, Inc. v. United States, 591
F.2d 620, 626 (Ct. Cl. 1979), in which the court stated that a substantial noncharitable
purpose or activity precludes exempt status, citing Better Business Bureau v. United
States, 326 U.S. 279, 283 (1945); St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. United States, 374 F.2d
427, 431 (8th Cir. 1967); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(c)(1). In fact, none of the cited
authorities states or implies that the exclusivity test applies to an entity's activities in
isolation from its purposes. For example, while the court in St. Louis Union Trust did
aver that "the existence of extensive good works ... is not enough if there is a substantial
nonqualifying activity," the context makes plain that the court regarded a "nonqualifying
activity" as one in furtherance of a nonexempt purpose. See St. Louis Union Trust, 374
F.2d at 431; see also Better Business Bureau, 326 U.S. at 283 (does not state or imply that
an activity may be inherently noncharitable); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(c)(1) (1959)
(same).
59. See Smith v. United States, 84-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 13,595, at 86,206-07
(W.D. Mo. 1984).
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II. THE CODE'S FRAMEWORK AND CASE LAW PERMIT
CHARITABLE STATUS FOR PUBLIC CEMETERIES
A. The Framework Analysis Does Not Bar
Charitable Treatment of Public Cemeteries
Some courts have relied on a framework analysis of the Code's charita-
ble provisions to deny estate tax deductions for bequests to public ceme-
teries.60 Under this analysis, the explicit references to nonprofit
cemeteries in discrete subsections of the income tax exemption and chari-
table deduction sections point ineluctably to a congressional intent that
no nonprofit cemetery is a charitable organization for income tax pur-
poses.6 1 Therefore, the courts reason, a public cemetery cannot be con-
strued as charitable under the estate tax charitable deduction section.62
Although superficially appealing, this reading of the Code's framework
does not survive close examination. 63 First, the framework analysis dis-
regards a distinction between public and private nonprofit cemeteries
that is recognized in both the common law' and federal tax law.65 Pri-
vate nonprofit cemeteries-those not open for the use of the public-
have been held eligible for income tax exemption under section
501(c)(13), even though they are clearly not charitable organizations
under section 501(c)(3).6 6 Other authority suggests that contributions to
such organizations are similarly eligible for the income tax charitable de-
60. See, e.g., Mellon Bank v. United States, 762 F.2d 283, 285-86 (3d Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1032 (1986); Child v. United States, 540 F.2d 579, 581-82 (2d Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1092 (1977); Gund's Estate v. Commissioner, 113 F.2d 61, 63-64
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 696 (1940); Robertson v. United States, 87-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) 13,712, at 87,936 (M.D. Tenn. 1987), aff'd, 838 F.2d 1215 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 245 (1988); Bank of Carthage v. United States, 304 F. Supp. 77, 80-81
(W.D. Mo. 1969).
61. See supra note 60.
62. See id.
63. See Mellon Bank v. United States, 475 U.S. 1032, 1034 (1986) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting to denial of certiorari).
64. See Starr Burying Ground Ass'n v. North Lane Cemetery Ass'n, 77 Conn. 83, 87,
58 A. 467, 469-70 (1904); Stewart v. Coshow, 238 Mo. 662, 673, 142 S.W. 283, 286
(1911); Davie v. Rochester Cemetery Ass'n, 91 N.H. 494, 495, 23 A.2d 377, 378 (1941);
Parker v. Fidelity Union Trust Co., 2 N.J. Super. 362, 390, 63 A.2d 902, 916-17 (1944);
14 Am. Jur. 2d Cemeteries § 2 and citations therein (1964 & Supp. March 1989); 14
C.J.S. Cemeteries § 1 and citations therein (1939 & Supp. 1989).
65. See, eg., John D. Rockefeller Family Cemetery Corp. v. Commissioner, 63 T.C.
355, 359, 363-64 (1974); Du Pont de Nemours Cemetery Co. v. Commissioner, 33
T.C.M. (CCH) 1438, 1442 (1974).
66. See Rockefeller, 63 T.C. at 363; accord Du Pont, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1442-43. In
both cases, the court rejected the I.R.S.'s contention that family-only cemetery companies
are ineligible for exemption under Code section 501(c)(13) because they do not serve
public purposes. See Rockefeller, 63 T.C. at 359, 363; Du Pont, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) at
1442. The Rockefeller court stated that in section 501(c)(13) Congress had plainly ex-
empted cemeteries "which would be unable to meet the stricter 501(c)(3) tests which




duction under section 170(c)(5).6 7 It can therefore be argued that Con-
gress' intent in enacting the cemetery-specific sections 501(c)(13) and
170(c)(5) was not to send a message that public cemeteries are nonchari-
table, but rather to extend tax benefits to certain private cemetery organi-
zations that would otherwise be ineligible for them.6"
Second, the framework analysis erroneously assumes that there is no
overlap among the subsections in the Code's income tax exemption and
deduction sections.69 Its tacit premise is that no nonprofit cemetery can
be charitable under income tax section 501(c)(3)-and hence under es-
tate tax section 2055(a)-because all nonprofit cemeteries must fall ex-
clusively within the purview of section 501(c)(13).70 Followed logically,
this construction would bar charitable status for purposes of the estate
tax charitable deduction section to any entity, regardless of its charitable
attributes, that falls into a class identified anywhere in section 501(c)
other than 501(c)(3). For example, because section 501(c)(4) exempts all
nonprofit organizations "operated exclusively for the social welfare," and
because section 2055(a) contains no parallel provision, the framework
analysis dictates that no social welfare organization may qualify as a
charitable entity under the estate tax charitable deduction section. All
legally charitable organizations can be said exclusively to promote the
social welfare.71 By its own terms, then, the framework analysis effec-
tively renders estate tax section 2055(a) a nullity. Congress could not
have intended such a perverse result. The framework analysis therefore
fails to demonstrate that courts are compelled by the structure of the
67. See Mellon Bank v. United States, 475 U.S. 1032, 1034 (1986) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting to denial of certiorari) (similarity in language of sections 501(c)(13) and
170(c)(5) suggests congressional intent that contributions to private nonprofit cemeteries
be tax deductible). There are no reported cases on the application of I.R.C. section
170(c)(5) to donations for the general maintenance or operations of private nonprofit
cemeteries. In a ruling predating the Tax Court's decisions in Rockefeller, 63 T.C. 355,
and Du Pont, 33 T.C.M. (CCII) 1438, the Service declared that a family cemetery was
ineligible for the section 501(c)(13) exemption, adding that contributions to such ceme-
teries are therefore also nondeductible. See Rev. Rul. 65-6, 1965-1 C.B. 229, 231. De-
spite its defeats in Rockefeller and Du Pont, the Service has not declared the ruling
obsolete.
68. See Mellon Bank v. United States, 475 U.S. 1032, 1034 (1986) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting to denial of certiorari). In justifying the framework analysis, one court noted
that the Senate Report on the 1954 Code stated that new section 170(c)(5) "'extend[ed]
the [income tax charitable] deduction ... beyond those allowed under present law to
contributions made to nonprofit cemeter[ies] . . . .'" Child v. United States, 540 F.2d
579, 582 (2d Cir. 1976) (quoting Senate Report on Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 4621, 4660),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1092 (1977). This language of the Report is not, however, inconsis-
tent with the position that some nonprofit cemeteries are charitable and that the "exten-
sion" of the deduction was to noncharitable (because private) nonprofit cemeteries.
69. This criticism of the framework analysis derives from arguments made to the
United States Supreme Court by the petitioner in Mellon Bank. See Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari at 10-11, Mellon Bank v. United States, 762 F.2d 283 (3d Cir. 1985) (No. 85-
459), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1032 (1986).
70. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
71. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
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Code to deny charitable status to public cemeteries under section
2055(a).
Third, the framework analysis that courts have applied in estate tax
cases on public cemeteries employs a strict construction of the Code's
charitable provisions.72 It thus contravenes the general rule that such
statutes are to be liberally construed.73 A liberal interpretation of the
structure of the statutes would take into account evidence of a congres-
sional intent to expand, not narrow, the tax benefits conferred on non-
profit cemeteries generally.74 A liberal construction would also avoid the
pitfall of imputing to the Code's charitable provisions a precision they
are not generally considered to possess.7" The sections describing the
72. The framework analysis was first used by a federal court to deny charitable status
to a public cemetery in an income tax charitable deduction case, Schuster v. Nichols, 20
F.2d 179 (D. Mass. 1927). The Schuster court offered in support of its holding the axiom
that "'exemption from taxation is an extraordinary grace of the sovereign power, and is
to be strictly construed.'" Id. at 181 (quoting Milford v. County Comm'rs, 213 Mass.
162, 165, 100 N.E.2d 60, 62 (1912)). Most of the courts that employed this framework
analysis in the estate tax context relied on Schuster. See, e.g., Mellon Bank v. United
States, 762 F.2d 283, 285 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied., 475 U.S. 1032 (1986); Child v.
United States, 540 F.2d 579, 583 n.7 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1092 (1977);
Gund's Estate v. Commissioner, 113 F.2d 61, 62-63 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 696
(1940).
73. See Helvering v. Bliss, 293 U.S. 144, 150-51 (1934) (Code's charitable exemption
was "begotten from motives of public policy, and [is] not to be narrowly construed.").
With respect to the estate tax charitable deduction, Professor Mertens states the principle
this way:
Charities... are favorites of the law. Their exemption ... is not a matter of
grace or favor but is rather an act of public justice .... Since the law is the
expression of an intent of Congress to promote gifts for altruistic objects by
encouraging testators to make them, it follows that the law is to be liberally
construed ....
4 J. Mertens, supra note 41, § 28.04, at 285-86 (footnotes omitted); see also 6 J. Mertens,
supra note 56, § 34.02 (charities are exception to the rule that exemptions from taxation
are strictly c6nstrued); cf. G. Bogert & G. Bogert, supra note 42, § 361, at 2-3 (in trust
law, "courts apply liberal rules of construction in an effort to find a charitable purpose").
74. The Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114 (1913), exempted from income tax
only "cemetery companies, organized and operated exclusively for the mutual benefit of
their members." See id., § IIG(a), at 172 (codified at I.R.C. § 501(c)(13) (1986)). In the
Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, 42 Stat. 227 (1921), this was enlarged by Congress to
include, in addition, all nonprofit cemetery companies and certain nonprofit cemetery
corporations. See id. § 231(5), at 253 (codified at I.R.C. § 501(c)(13) (1986)). In the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, ch. 1, 68A Stat. 3 (1954), Congress added nonprofit
cemeteries to the list of eligible donees for the income tax charitable contribution deduc-
tion. See id., § 170(c)(5), at 60 (codified at I.R.C. § 170(c)(5) (1986)). In 1970, Congress
added operation of crematoria to the permissbile purposes of cemetery corporations ex-
empt from income taxation. See Pub. L. No. 91-618, 84 Stat. 1855 (1970) (codified at
I.R.C. § 501(c)(13) (1986)).
75. Many entities that now receive the benefits of charitable status under the income
tax chapter could not do so if courts and the I.R.S. chose always to read the statutes
literally. Under Code section 2055(a)(2), for example, "encouragement of art" is speci-
fied as a purpose qualifying a transfer by bequest for a charitable deduction. No mention
is made of this purpose in income tax section 501(c)(3) or 170(c)(2)(B). A strict construc-
tion parallel to the framework analysis would hold that because Congress mentioned en-
couragement of art in the estate tax deduction section and omitted it from the income tax
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groups that qualify for charitable treatment have taken shape over the
course of many years,76 and the inconsistencies among them give evi-
dence that Congress did not act with one mind in formulating them.77
Finally, a liberal reading would avert the ultimately irrational and unfair
result that the framework analysis mandates, under which inter vivos
contributions to public cemeteries are deductible while contributions by
will are not.78
B. Public Cemeteries Have Charitable Purposes
Recognized by the Code
In ruling that the word "charitable" in the Internal Revenue Code
must be given its broad legal meaning,7 9 the Supreme Court in Bob Jones
University v. United States recognized as charitable under the Code the
wide variety of public purposes ratified by the common law of charitable
trusts.8 The Court thus swept away the precedential value of lower
court holdings that denied charitable status to public cemeteries when
the purpose of such cemeteries is not narrowly confined to relief of the
burdens of the poor. 1 In determining whether public cemeteries serve
charitable purposes recognized by the Code, therefore, the proper inquiry
is whether the common law deems such entities to be charitable.82
Strong authority that public cemeteries are charitable institutions ex-
ists in the American common law of charitable trusts83 and in other case
exemption and deduction sections, it must have intended that no arts group receive the
benefits of the latter. Yet the opposite result is clearly established in case and regulatory
authority, see B. Hopkins, supra note 10, § 6.9, at 123-26 and citations therein, indicating
that such a precise reading of the Code is not generally employed.
76. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 614-17 (1983) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (reviewing development of income tax charitable exemption provision be-
tween 1894 and 1976); Liles & Blum, Development of the Federal Tax Treatment of Char-
ities, 39 Law & Contemp. Probs. 6, 24-40 (No. 4, 1975) (reviewing development of
income, estate, and gift tax charitable deduction sections between 1917 and 1969).
77. See, e.g., C. Lowndes, R. Kramer & J. McCord, Federal Estate and Gift Taxes
§ 16.1 (3d ed. 1974) (describing "perplexing" variations in lists of qualified organizations
and purposes in Code's income, estate, and gift tax charitable deduction sections); Mc-
Govern, supra note 17, at 524 (Code's exemption provisions reflect no "planned legisla-
tive scheme" or "unified concept" but were enacted over eight decades "by a variety of
legislators for a variety of reasons."); cf Mellon Bank v. United States, 762 F.2d 283, 288
(3d Cir. 1985) (Aldisert, C.J., dissenting) (omission of public cemeteries from enumerated
charitable purposes of section 2055(a) was "technical drafting oversight" by Congress),
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1032 (1986).
78. See Mellon Bank, 762 F.2d at 287-88 (Aldisert, C.J., dissenting).
79. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
80. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 586-92 (1983).
81. See Child v. United States, 540 F.2d 579, 582-83 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1092 (1977); Gund's Estate v. Commissioner, 113 F.2d 61, 63-64 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 311 U.S. 696 (1940); Bank of Carthage v. United States, 304 F. Supp. 77, 80
(W.D. Mo. 1969); Wilber Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 17 B.T.A. 654, 661 (1929).
82. See Mellon Bank, 762 F.2d at 288 (Aldisert, C.J., dissenting).
83. See, e.g., Hopkins v. Grimshaw, 165 U.S. 342, 352-53 (1897) (dictum); Stub-
blefield v. Peoples Bank, 406 Ill. 374, 386-88, 94 N.E.2d 127, 133-34 (1950); Chapman v.
Newell, 146 Iowa 415, 419-21, 125 N.W. 324, 326-27 (1910); Carlisle County v. Norris,
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law. 4 The charitable purposes ascribed to such cemeteries in judicial
opinions and commentaries on the law of trusts include lessening the
burdens of government,85 supplying a place to bury the community's
dead decently, 6 promoting public health,8 7 public aesthetics,8 8 and his-
torical preservation, 89 and fostering respect for the dead and other moral
values of a civilized society.90 These purposes are public in that they
benefit the entire community, not just those members of it who avail
themselves of the public cemetery directly. 91 Hence the purposes of pub-
200 Ky. 338, 339-41, 254 S.W. 1044, 1045 (1923); McElwain v. Attorney General, 241
Mass. 112, 118, 134 N.E. 620, 621 (1922); Stewart v. Coshow, 238 Mo. 662, 673-75, 142
S.W. 283, 286-87 (1911); Parker v. Fidelity Union Trust Co., 2 N.J. Super. 362, 388-92,
63 A.2d 902, 913-17 (1944); In re Estate of Anderson, 571 P.2d 880, 883 (Okla. Ct. App.
1977); Pope v. Alexander, 194 Tenn. 146, 152-53, 250 S.W.2d 51, 54-55 (1951); City of
Tacoma v. Tacoma Cemetery, 28 Wash. 238, 244, 68 P. 723, 725 (1902); see also Restate-
ment (Second) of Trusts § 374 comment h (1959) ("trust for maintenance of a public
cemetery... is a charitable institution"); II A. Scott & W. Fratcher, The Law of Trusts
§ 124.2, at 257 (4th ed. 1987) (bequest for upkeep of public cemetery is charitable trust);
IVA A. Scott & W. Fratcher, supra note 41, § 374.9, at 243 (nonprofit public cemetery is
charitable institution); Annotation, Gift for Maintenance or Care of Private Cemetery or
Burial Lot, or of Tomb or of Monument, Including the Erection Thereof, as Valid Trust,
47 A.L.R.2d 596, § 1, at 600 (1956) (trust for maintenance of public cemetery is valid
charity); 14 C.J.S. Charities § 14 (1939 & Supp. 1989) (same).
84. See, e.g., In re Estate of Edwards, 88 Cal. App. 3d 383, 391, 151 Cal. Rptr. 770,
776 (1979) (public cemetery charitable for purposes of state death taxes); Davie v. Roch-
ester Cemetery Ass'n, 91 N.H. 494, 498, 23 A.2d 377, 380 (1941) (public cemetery chari-
table for purposes of state unemployment compensation act); see also Mellon Bank v.
United States, 475 U.S. 1032, 1034 (1986) (O'Connor, J., dissenting to denial of certio-
rari) (noting "virtually uniform consensus" in state common and statutory law that pub-
lic cemeteries are charitable and bequests to them exempt from inheritance taxes); Mellon
Bank v. United States, 762 F.2d 283, 288 (3d Cir. 1985) (Aldisert, C.J., dissenting) (pub-
lic cemetery is charitable organization), cert denied, 475 U.S. 1032 (1986); Child v.
United States, 540 F.2d 579, 585-90 (2d Cir. 1976) (Anderson, J., dissenting) (same), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1092 (1977).
85. See Child, 540 F.2d at 585-86 (Anderson, J., dissenting); Smith v. United States,
84-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 13,595, at 86,206 (W.D. Mo. 1984); Estate of Edwards, 88
Cal. App. 3d at 391, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 775-76; Lake View v. Rose Hill Cemetery Co., 70
Ill. 191, 195 (1873); Bushong v. Taylor, 161 Tenn. 522, 529, 33 S.W.2d 80, 82 (1930);
IVA A. Scott & W. Fratcher, supra note 41, § 374.9, at 243; 14 Am. Jur. 2d Cemeteries
§ 3, at 700 (1964).
86. See Child, 540 F.2d at 588 (Anderson, J., dissenting); Stubblefield, 406 Ill. at 386,
94 N.E.2d at 133; Lake View, 70 Ill. at 195; Chapman, 146 Iowa at 420, 125 N.W. at 327.
87. See Child, 540 F.2d at 587 (Anderson, J., dissenting); Starr Burying Ground
Ass'n v. North Lane Cemetery Ass'n, 77 Conn. 83, 87, 58 A. 467, 469 (1904); Stub-
blefield, 406 Ill. at 386, 94 N.E.2d at 133; Parker, 2 N.J. Super. at 391, 63 A.2d at 917;
Bushong, 161 Tenn. at 529, 33 S.W.2d at 82; G. Bogert & G. Bogert, supra note 42, § 377,
at 170.
88. See Child, 540 F.2d at 587 (Anderson, J., dissenting); Lake View, 70 Ill. at 195-96.
89. See Stubblefield v. Peoples Bank, 406 Ill. 374, 386, 94 N.E.2d 127, 133 (1950); G.
Bogert & G. Bogert, supra note 42, § 377, at 170.
90. See Metairie Cemetery Ass'n v. United States, 282 F.2d 225, 228 n.8 (5th Cir.
1960); Stubblefield, 406 Ill. at 386, 94 N.E.2d at 133; Chapman v. Newell, 146 Iowa 415,
420-21, 125 N.W. 324, 327 (1910); G. Bogert & G. Bogert, supra note 42, § 377, at 169.
91. One court has suggested that public cemeteries may not have the requisite public
purposes because they benefit only the limited number of persons who purchase
gravesites. See Estate of Amick v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 924, 930 (1977). This view
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lic cemeteries are charitable within the intendment of the Code.
C. Public Cemeteries Have Exclusively Charitable Purposes
To qualify under the Code's charitable exemption and deduction sec-
tions, an organization must comply with the statutory requirement that
its purposes be "exclusively" charitable.92 The exclusivity test is gener-
ally satisfied upon a showing that an organization's purposes are primar-
ily charitable in nature93 as evidenced by the fact that its funds and
activities are primarily devoted to achieving charitable ends.94
Some courts considering the deductibility of bequests to public ceme-
teries under Code section 2055(a) have applied the exclusivity require-
ment to hold that certain activities of public cemeteries preclude
charitable status. 95 To the extent that these opinions relied on the prem-
ise that the only permissible substantial activities of a charitable entity
are those that further the purpose of benefitting the indigent,9 6 they are
overruled by Bob Jones University v. United States.97
One court, however, looked not at the organizational purposes served
by the activities of public cemeteries but at the activities in isolation. 98
While holding that the cemeteries in question had legitimately charitable
purposes, the court stated that selling of gravesites and maintenance of
cemetery property were inherently noncharitable activities.99 On the ba-
sis of these activities alone, the court concluded that the cemeteries were
not exclusively charitable organizations."° This reasoning misapplies
mistakenly fails to take account of the broad and diffuse public puposes ascribed to such
cemeteries by the common law of charities. See supra notes 85-90 and accompanying
text; see also G. Bogert & G. Bogert, supra note 42, § 362, at 4-6 (beneficiary of every
charitable trust is the public; persons served directly are "merely instrumentalities
through which the community benefits flow"); cf. McNulty, supra note 14, at 235-36 (tax-
deductible gifts to charities offering "public goods and services" produce diffuse benefits).
Moreover, the View that public cemeteries do not have public purposes erroneously im-
plies that a valid charity must bestow an equal benefit on every member of the public.
Neither the Code nor the common law so requires. See, e.g., Sound Health Ass'n v.
Commissioner, 71 T.C. 158, 185 (1978) (Code's charitable provisions do not require di-
rect benefit to every member of community); B. Hopkins, supra note 10, § 4.4, at 75(same); IVA A. Scott & W. Fratcher, supra note 41, § 375.1, at 262 (if class of potential
beneficiaries is sufficiently large, small number of actual beneficiaries is irrelevant to char-
itable status); id. § 375.2, at 266 (not every community member need be actual or poten-
tial beneficiary of valid charitable trust).
92. See I.R.C. §§ 170(c)(2)(B), 501(c)(3), 2055(a)(2) (1986).
93. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
94. See B. Hopkins, supra note 10, § 11.1, at 225-26; 6 J. Mertens, supra note 56,
§ 34.07, at 34-35.
95. See Child v. United States, 540 F.2d 579, 582-84 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1092 (1977); Smith v. United States, 84-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 13,595, at 86,206
(W.D. Mo. 1984); Estate of Amick v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 924, 927-28 (1977).
96. See Child, 540 F.2d at 582-84; Estate of Amick, 67 T.C. at 927-28.
97. 461 U.S. 574 (1983); see supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
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the exclusivity doctrine by focusing on the cemeteries' activities outside
the context of their overall purposes. 01
Neither the courts nor the Internal Revenue Service have developed a
consistent standard for determining how much income-generating activ-
ity an organization may carry on before its purposes can no longer be
considered exclusively charitable."0 2 That an organization may charge
user fees to support its charitable functions without losing charitable sta-
tus under the Code is, however, well established in federal tax law and
practice.10 3 Moreover, the Service explicitly permits a charitable entity
to engage in "substantial" business activity in furtherance of its charita-
ble purposes, even when the business itself is unrelated to those pur-
poses."m A finding that otherwise qualified cemeteries cannot be
charitable simply because they sell gravesites in order to accomplish their
charitable purpose of burying the community's dead therefore has little
support. 105
Similarly, there is scant justification for the position that maintenance
of cemetery property by an otherwise charitable cemetery is a disqualify-
ing activity under the exclusivity doctrine. Physical care of burial
grounds furthers the acknowledged charitable purposes of public ceme-
101. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
102. See B. Hopkins, supra note 10, § 6.9, at 119-23, & ch. 11; 6 J. Mertens, supra note
56, § 34.07; P. Treusch, supra note 18, chs. 3-D.02 to .03; Thompson, supra note 14, at
15-32. Some courts have stated that the standard should be whether the commercial
activity is so dominant that it becomes the organization's primary purpose, transcending
its charitable purposes. See, eg., Elisian Guild, Inc. v. United States, 412 F.2d 121, 124
(1st Cir. 1969); Aid to Artisans, Inc. v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 202, 211-12 (1978). This
test accords with the rule that an entity's purposes, not its activities, are the proper focus
of the exclusivity doctrine. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
103. A multitude of nonprofit schools and universities, hospitals and nursing homes,
theaters, symphonies, museums, and other entities remain eligible for charitable treat-
ment under the Code even though they are paid for some or all of the services they
provide. See B. Hopkins, supra note 10, § 6.9, at 119-23 and citations therein;
Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations from Corporate Income
Taxation, 91 Yale L.J. 54, 57 n.16 and citations therein (1981); Thompson, supra note 14,
at 27-32 and citations therein. This general rule tracks that of the common law of chari-
ties, which also recognizes entities that charge fees for their services, as long as the pro-
ceeds are devoted to charitable purposes and no private individual profits from them. See
G. Bogert & G. Bogert, supra note 42, § 364, at 24-26; Restatement (Second) of Trusts
§ 376 comments c & d (1959); IVA A. Scott & W. Fratcher, supra note 41, § 375.2, at
277, § 376, at 299-303.
104. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(e)(1) (as amended in 1976); see also P. Treusch,
supra note 18, ch. 3-D.10 (greater latitude given when business activity is functionally
related to organization's exempt purposes than when it is not). A charitable organization
operating an unrelated business may, however, be subject to tax on the income thus de-
rived. See I.R.C. §§ 501(b), 511-513 (1986).
105. Courts' and the Service's occasional denials of charitable status to otherwise qual-
ified organizations on the ground that they do not provide goods or services at below cost
or for free have been criticized as arbitrary and a misapplication of the exclusivity doc-
trine. See, e.g., Consumer Credit Counseling Serv. of Alabama, Inc. v. United States, 78-
2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9660, at 85,191 (D.D.C. 1978); Federation Pharmacy Servs., Inc. v.
Commissioner, 72 T.C. 687, 696-701 (1979) (Tietjens, J., dissenting), aff'd, 625 F.2d 804
(8th Cir. 1980); B. Hopkins, supra note 10, § 6.9, at 119-23.
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teries by evincing respect for the dead and preserving their memories for
the community. 106 The common law of charitable trusts recognizes
trusts for the maintenance of public cemeteries as charitable.1 7 In addi-
tion, perpetual care trusts and other arrangements for preservation of
cemetery grounds are the subject of many state law privileges108 and re-
quirements, 10 9 demonstrating that public policy recognizes a close rela-
tion between burial of the dead and care for the places in which they are
buried.
Both the charging of fees for gravesites and the maintenance of
grounds further the charitable purposes of public cemeteries. Therefore,
neither activity runs afoul of the Code's exclusivity requirement.
III. PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS WARRANT
CHARITABLE STATUS FOR PUBLIC CEMETERIES
A widely accepted rationale for the Code's charitable exemption and
deduction provisions is that they are the broad expression of the federal
government's interest in encouraging the work of nonprofit, nongovern-
mental organizations that serve public policy goals.' 10 When an organi-
zation is found to meet the statutory requirements, charitable status
under the Code should be denied only if the organization undermines or
conflicts with a fundamental public policy."1
No such bar is raised to public cemeteries. For example, the income
tax exemption and charitable deduction benefits Congress has given to
106. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
107. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 374 comment h (1959); II A. Scott & W.
Fratcher, supra note 83, § 124.2, at 257.
108. See infra notes 113-114 and accompanying text.
109. See, e.g., In re Memorial Properties, Inc., 690 F.2d 158, 159 (8th Cir. 1982) (dis-
cussing Arkansas statute requiring all cemeteries to establish permanent maintenance
funds); Rosebrough Monument Co. v. Memorial Park Cemetery Ass'n, 666 F.2d 1130,
1136 (8th Cir. 1981) (discussing Missouri statute to same effect), cert. denied, 457 U.S.
1111 (1982); Reed v. Knollwood Park Cemetery, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 1144, 1146 & n.4
(E.D.N.Y. 1977) (discussing New York statute to same effect); Provident Natl Bank v.
United States, 325 F. Supp. 1187, 1189 & n.1 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (discussing Pennsylvania
statute to same effect); Schmidt v. Pine Lawn Memorial Park, Inc., 88 S.D. 665, 667-68,
227 N.W.2d 438, 439-40 (1975) (discussing South Dakota statute requiring that, after
certain deductions, cemeteries must apply all proceeds from sale of gravesites to mainte-
nance of cemetery grounds); Frederick & Porcano, Taxation of Cemetery Organizations,
57 Taxes 186, 190 (1979) (cemeteries "usually required by state law" to establish perpet-
ual care trust funds for maintenance of grounds).
110. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 586-90 (1983); Helvering v.
Bliss, 293 U.S. 144, 150-51 (1934); B. Hopkins, supra note 10, § 1.2; P. Treusch, supra
note 18, ch. 1-B.02.
111. See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 591-92. The common law also requires that a
valid charity be consistent with law and public policy. See G. Bogert & G. Bogert, supra
note 42, § 368, at 58, § 378, at 191; Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 377 comment c
(1959); IVA A. Scott,& W. Fratcher, supra note 41, § 377. Underlying this mandate is
the recognition that the public suffers some disadvantage from the tax and other privi-
leges accorded charities, which must be offset by an unequivocal public benefit. See Bob
Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 591-92; G. Bogert & G. Bogert, supra note 42, § 361, at 3.
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nonprofit private cemeteries"' may be plausibly interpreted as expressing
a view that nonprofit cemeteries generally--even those not held open to
the public-promote the good of the community at large. This interpre-
tation is strongly supported by the long tradition in state statutory law of
encouraging private cemetery upkeep trusts.1 13 Such statutes demon-
strate the judgment of state legislatures that care for the resting places of
the dead furthers the ends of public policy." 4
State court decisions affirming the charitable nature of public ceme-
teries also articulate strong public policy rationales." 5 Among them is
that public cemeteries relieve government of burdens it would otherwise
have to bear at public expense. 16 This justification has been identified as
lying at the core of Congress' grant of special status to charitable organi-
zations under the federal tax laws. 117 In this light, public cemeteries as a
112. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
113. See G. Bogert & G. Bogert, supra note 42, § 377, at 166; IVA A. Scott & W.
Fratcher, supra note 41, § 374.9, at 236-37; Annotation, supra note 83, § 10, at 611-12.
Legislative intervention is necessary because the common law has generally struck down
private cemetery upkeep trusts on the grounds that they are invalid as charitable trusts
for lack of a sufficient public purpose, see G. Bogert & G. Bogert, supra note 42, § 377, at
162-63; Annotation, supra note 83, § 10, at 611-12, and invalid as private trusts for lack
of living beneficiaries, see G. Bogert & G. Bogert, supra note 42, § 377, at 159-60; II A.
Scott & W. Fratcher, supra note 83, § 112.3.
114. See Metairie Cemetery Ass'n v. United States, 282 F.2d 225, 228 n.8 (5th Cir.
1960); G. Bogert & G. Bogert, supra note 42, § 377, at 169-70; Annotation, supra note 83,
§ 10, at 611-12. In addition, the Internal Revenue Code itself permits even for-profit
cemeteries to deduct from their gross income a portion of the amounts paid from upkeep
trusts they create for maintenance of cemetery grounds. See I.R.C. § 642(i) (1986). An
ancient public policy justification for validating trusts for the maintenance of tombs may
be found in E. Coke, Third Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England (London 1628 &
facsim. reprint 1979):
[Tihese monuments do serve for four good uses and ends. First, for evidence,
and proof of descents, and pedegrees. Secondly, what time he that is there bur-
ied deceased. Thirdly, for example, to follow the good, or to eschew the evill.
Fourthly, to put the living in mind of their end, for all the sons of Adam must
die.
Id. at 203.
115. See supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
116. See In re Estate of Edwards, 88 Cal. App. 3d 383, 391, 151 Cal. Rptr. 770, 775-76
(1979); Lake View v. Rose Hill Cemetery Co., 70 Ill. 191, 195 (1873); Bushong v. Taylor,
161 Tenn. 522, 529, 33 S.W.2d 80, 82 (1930); see also Child v. United States, 540 F.2d
579, 586 & n.3 (2d Cir. 1976) (Anderson, J., dissenting) (citing New York statutes pro-
viding for local governments to take over maintenance of abandoned or neglected ceme-
teries within their borders), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1092 (1977); Mellon Bank v. United
States, 590 F. Supp. 160, 164 & n.3 (W.D. Pa. 1984) (citing Pennsylvania statute to same
effect), rev'd on other grounds, 762 F.2d 283 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1032
(1986); Wunderlin v. Lutheran Cemetery, 49 Misc. 2d 836, 837, 268 N.Y.S.2d 514, 516
(1966) (upholding state tax levies on cemetery lot owners for maintenance of burial
grounds when needed "to prevent cemeteries from falling into disrepair and.., becoming
a burden on the entire community"), modified on other grounds, 27 A.D.2d 861, 278
N.Y.S.2d 544 (1967).
117. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 587-88, 590-91 (1983); Child,
540 F.2d at 585 (Anderson, J., dissenting); B. Hopkins, supra note 10, § 1.2, at 5-6; Bitt-
ker & Rahdert, supra note 16, at 332. "[L]essening of the burdens of Government" is
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class not only do not conflict with public policy but actively advance its
goals. Hence they fulfill the Code's requirement that charitable organiza-
tions must harmonize with public policy.
CONCLUSION
Public cemeteries fall well within the class of organizations eligible for
"charitable" treatment under the Internal Revenue Code. Serving pur-
poses widely accepted in the common law of charitable trusts, they meet
the Supreme Court's standard for charitable status in the federal tax
laws. The purposes of public cemeteries are also "exclusively" charita-
ble, as the relevant statutes demand. The framework of the Code's chari-
table provisions, moreover, poses no obstacle to the grant of the estate
tax charitable deduction for bequests for the general maintenance and
operations of public cemeteries. Considerations of public policy add fur-
ther support to this position. The issue therefore deserves a reexamina-
tion by the federal courts, and a different resolution.
Anne Berrill Whalen
also enumerated as a distinct ground for charitable status under the Code by the I.R.S.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(2) (as amended in 1976).
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